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Abstract
At the center of debates on deliberative democracy is the issue of how much real deliberation
citizens experience in their core social networks. These ―disagreements about disagreement‖ come
in a variety of forms, with scholars advocating significantly different empirical approaches (e.g.,
Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Mutz 2006), and coming to significantly different substantive conclusions. We
tackle these discrepancies by investigating the effect of conceptual and measurement differences on
key findings relating interpersonal political disagreement to political attitudes and behaviors.
Drawing on the 2008-2009 ANES panel study, we find evidence that different measures of
disagreement have distinct effects when it comes to individuals‘ preferences, patterns of
engagement, and propensities to participate. We discuss the implications of these findings for the
study of social influence; as interpersonal disagreement can mean different things and does not have
easily characterized effects, scholars should exercise caution when making pronouncements
concerning its empirical and democratic consequences.

Paper prepared for presentation at the 4th annual meeting of the Political Networks Conference,
June 14-18, 2011. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2010 meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association.

As suggested by Lasswell‘s (1936) classic definition of politics – who gets what, when, and
how – conflict is inevitable in any political process. Yet conflict also seems to be the part of politics
most disliked by average citizens. At best, they may find disagreement among elites distasteful
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), and with friends uncomfortable (Ulbig and Funk 1999). At
worst, disdain stemming from clashing points of view may lead to withdrawal from the public
sphere, diminishing the relationship between citizens and policy-makers (Mutz 2006).
In the realm of political behavior, a recent revival of interest in disagreement stems from
normative theories of political deliberation that promote a different view of how representative
democracy functions effectively. Though liberal democratic theories emphasize the need for
individuals to be educated and civically engaged in order to be politically active, deliberative theories
focus on collective processes and the exchange of viewpoints. While theoretical discussion of
deliberative democracy is lively and well-developed, empirical scholarship on the mass public has
focused principally on the question of the behavioral impact of political disagreement.
In short, the consequences of everyday political disagreement remain unclear. Some
research indicates that disagreement between citizens makes those in the minority less likely to vote
in line with their underlying partisanship (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988; Sokhey and McClurg n.d.),
that it increases opinion ambivalence (Mutz 2002), and that it decreases political participation
(McClurg 2006a; Mutz 2002; 2006). Other research suggests that such findings are overstated either
because they are conditional on other attributes of social networks, or are nonexistent (Huckfeldt et
al. 2004; McClurg 2006b; Nir 2005). Clarity about what produces such divergent results is needed so
we can better assess how political conflict between individuals affects the quality of citizenship. It is
in this intellectual context that we revisit what is meant by "everyday political disagreement," that we
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reconsider how to measure it in the real world, and that we reassess its implications for empirical
analyses, and ultimately, democratic practice.
We begin by focusing on two analytical problems that shape our current understanding of
interpersonal political disagreement. One revolves around the inadequate conceptualization and
measurement of the core concept; common measurement practices have emerged without sufficient
attention having been given to defining disagreement, to developing adequate measures for different
definitions, and to examining the impact that alternative measurements have on models used to
evaluate behavioral consequences. A second set of challenges center on difficulties in making causal
inferences (e.g., Klofstad 2007, 2011). Though a growing body of work demonstrates that political
discussion effects are real, care must be exercised as most of the data available for testing theoretical
claims are cross-sectional in nature, and therefore susceptible to methodological problems such as
endogeneity, reciprocal causation, and selection bias.
In the sections that follow, we tackle interpersonal disagreement with an eye toward both
problems. In doing so we aim to bring new perspective to current practices and order to previous
results. We employ two measures of disagreement that occupy different points on what we view as
the range of definitions of political disagreement. One is a general measure of how different people
see the views of their network members as being from their own views, and the second is based on
the perceived partisanship of network members. Using propensity score matching to address
confounding factors, we examine how both measures relate to civic engagement, the strength of
political preferences, and basic participation in a national sample of Americans from the 2008-2009
American National Election Studies Panel Survey. Our findings suggest that care should be
exercised when making blunt pronouncements; the supposedly dire consequences of disagreement
are muted when we carefully address concerns about conceptualization and inference. It is only
what we will call the ―most severe‖ disagreements that appear to hold behavioral consequences, and
2

even these are restricted to the strength of political preferences, rather than political engagement or
political participation.
Everyday Political Disagreement
Everyday political disagreement refers to conversations where individuals are exposed to
viewpoints that are different from their own. Such exchanges are particularly important for
understanding political behavior, because without the possibility of learning new information or
views there is little opportunity for social communication to alter past patterns of behavior. Put
another way, disagreement drives social influence (McPhee 1963; Sprague 1982). Political
disagreement is also important because it may help us understand how individual preferences
translate into citizen inputs into the political system. When there is no exchange of views between
citizens, the lines of debate are hard and fast, and potentially inhibit compromise among
representative officials. That is, preferences are relatively fixed, and the ability of governments to
provide representation becomes largely a function of institutional design (Dahl 1963). Yet when
there is some exchange of views between citizens, public representation becomes a matter not just
of how we aggregate preferences through institutions, but of how the public reacts to different
viewpoints and adjusts its own behavior.
For example, if conflicting views create intolerance for others' preferences, it can
delegitimize governing elites who do not share the ideas of majorities. Or, if conflict causes some
groups of voters (e.g., majority opinion holders) to express their opinions more insistently and to
participate more than others groups (e.g., minority opinion holders), then government may be more
responsive to some groups than others (Noelle-Neuman 1993). Of course, it is also possible that
disagreement affects preferences themselves, suggesting that what is in the public's interest is a
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dynamic phenomenon that changes as we deliberate, potentially leading to "better" public opinion
and policy outputs (e.g., Fishkin 1995).1
Accordingly, there is acute interest in how much disagreement occurs between citizens in
their everyday lives. Yet in what has become a hallmark of this literature, even the basic question of
how much disagreement exists between citizens is itself contested. For example, Huckfeldt et al.
(2004) have argued that disagreement is the modal condition in the American electorate (based upon
average network size and various probabilities of disagreement between any two members).
Conversely, Mutz (2006) makes an argument for low levels of disagreement. She notes that not only
are levels of disagreement between dyads very low in national probability samples, but that levels of
communication in those dyads are also exceptionally low. In short, despite examining similar data,
Mutz and Huckfeldt and colleagues draw largely opposite conclusions.
Another significant line of debate focuses on the consequences of disagreeable social
interactions. For example, Mutz's seminal contributions (2002a, 2002b, 2006) on ―cross-cutting
discussion‖ suggest that while disagreement leads to better understandings of and tolerance for
different viewpoints, it leads to lower levels of political participation. Otherwise stated, her
suggestion is that disagreement in social networks leads people to deliberate, but not participate. Yet
even while she makes this argument forcefully, there are indicators that the choice between
deliberative and participatory democracy is perhaps not so stark. Some scholars report that
disagreement is either positively or statistically insignificantly related to participation (e.g., Nir 2005);
others suggest that the influence of disagreement is variable, subject to other elements in a person‘s
network (e.g., Djupe, Sokhey, and Gilbert 2007; McClurg 2006a), or the broader social context in
which it occurs (McClurg 2006b; Noelle-Neuman 1993).

1

See Delli Carpini et al. (2004) for a thorough review of the empirical deliberation literature.
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What explains such inconsistent findings? To a certain extent they may be the consequence
of different bases of evidence and varying theoretical predilections. However, we argue that two
analytical problems—i.e., the inconsistent conceptualization of disagreement, and the potential
biases involved in estimating effects with cross-sectional, ego-centric data—are the likely culprits.
Simply put, we argue that ―what one sees,‖ to some degree, depends on what one thinks constitutes
disagreement. With more attention to concept and analysis, we can better understand when
disagreement presents opportunities for learning, and at what point it becomes a barrier to civic
engagement.
Analytical Problems in the Study of Political Disagreement
Conceptualizing Disagreement
Almost all political science studies of everyday political disagreement employ measures that
focus on some aspect of discussion occurring across lines of political difference. However, this is
where agreement about disagreement ends. The basic theoretical question is as follows: at what
point do political conversations become disagreeable and start affecting political behavior? This
point is illustrated by contrasting the measures used in two of the most -cited studies in the
contemporary field: Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague's (2004) Political Disagreement, and Mutz's
(2006) Hearing the Other Side. Defining the underlying concept of disagreement is not the main thrust
of either study, yet their different measurement strategies reflect distinct theoretical predilections
that bracket the potential range of conceptual definitions that could be used to derive measurements
of disagreement. By bringing such predilections to the forefront, we can bring order to this
literature and make further progress in understanding the role that political disagreement plays in
American civil society.
Huckfeldt et al. measure disagreement as discord in the vote choice of a respondent and her
discussant. In this approach, a person who prefers one presidential candidate encounters
5

disagreement even if their discussant prefers no presidential candidate. There are many conceptual
benefits to such a measurement approach; it is anchored in political preferences, it is about an
individual‘s perceptions of their communication environment, and we have a very good sense of
what the disagreement is about. At the same time, this measurement may be more appropriately
conceived of as measuring the absence of agreement rather than the presence of disagreement. In
turn, this may overstate the importance of social exchanges with low political salience; that is,
exchanges that do not really create the pronounced opportunities for learning that are central to
theories of disagreement and deliberative democracy. In this sense, the underlying concept
emphasizes a measure that is anchored in preferences that are relatively concrete, but exchanges that
have minimal conflict, and thus may not always be perceived clearly or judged to be salient by the
parties in the exchange (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988; Mutz and Martin 2001).2
Mutz seeks to measure survey respondents‘ perceptions of how much they disagree with
their named discussants. Specifically, her approach is to create an index of disagreement that
combines information from a variety of survey questions, including shared vote preferences, shared

2

The accuracy of individuals‘ reports of their discussants is a perennial concern when using ego-

centric network data (as we do in our analyses). However, it is worth noting that while biased
perception exists, studies that collect data from the focal respondent and her discussants have found
that individuals are not highly inaccurate in their estimates of others‘ levels of expertise (Huckfeldt
2001) or political orientations. Also, Fowler et al. (2011) remind us that Huckfeldt and colleagues
(e.g., 1987; 2000) report about 80% of respondents as accurately identifying the political preferences
of named discussants. Per our arguments, it is also worth considering that perceptions, regardless of
their degree of accuracy, might be more important than reality when it comes to understanding the
consequences of socially-supplied disagreement for political behavior (Mutz and Martin 2001).
6

partisan preferences, general perceptions of disagreement, general perceptions of shared opinions,
and levels/frequencies of disagreement. The strength of this measure is that it does not rely solely
on vote choice for determining whether disagreement may exist; it instead focuses on the
respondents‘ explicit recognition of disagreement during social exchanges. Another potential
strength is that this approach measures exposure to disagreement by including the frequency of
political discussion in the index, rather than assuming that disagreement is not reliant on frequency
of interaction. Unlike the Huckfeldt et al. measure, this one is weighted towards more intense
disagreements.3 As a consequence, we argue that Mutz‘s approach potentially overlooks what we see
as the more common, but less intense, discussions in which differing viewpoints are exchanged.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
These two approaches give us insight into the deeper theoretical problem surrounding
everyday political disagreement. If we imagine a hypothetical conversation between two people, we
could classify any political discussion they have as falling between two possible endpoints: complete
agreement or complete disagreement about politics.4 From this, we can then begin to think about
separating such a space between conversations best characterized as being agreeable or disagreeable,
3

This is particularly true when we consider that most social network survey questions solicit

information on family and close friends, or people with whom individuals are likely biased against
thinking that they "disagree" in any general sense. Since people have incentives to downplay levels
of conflict among their family and friends, it is likely that these conversations must be salient if they
are willing to admit that there is disagreement (Conover et al. 2002; Mutz and Martin 2001).
4

The discussion here considers disagreement as an isolated, one-dimensional concept. We

acknowledge that this is a simplistic, if useful, assumption. Future work should consider other
content dimensions (as well as degree and frequency of social communication). We are grateful to
an anonymous reviewer for insightful comments on this matter.
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as illustrated in Figure 1. The point at which an analyst decides to separate (or sort political
discussions as being agreeable versus disagreeable) can lead to different categorizations of
conversations. Within this conceptual space there are significant differences in the underlying points
of view between discussants, and in the degree to which differences are recognized and registered as
significant. We contend that these fundamental differences have led to confusion over the amount,
causes, and consequences of everyday political disagreement.
To clarify, let us return to our earlier example: we view the approaches of Huckfeldt and
colleagues and Mutz as leaning towards different points on this conceptual space. An approach
based on the logic of the Huckfeldt et al. measure allows for disagreement to occur in any exchange
where agreement is absent (albeit in the context of voting), but does not require the respondent to
see preferences as being a source of disagreement. Alternatively, a conceptualization based on the
priorities of the Mutz measure is more likely to weigh intense and persistent disagreements more
heavily – that is, disagreements that are strong enough to be readily recognizable to individuals.
Both measures capture political differences between people, but the nature of conversations
that they capture (and their consequences) may vary dramatically. For example, while the Huckfeldt
et al. measure would suggest that widespread opportunities for learning something about politics
exist (because of the absence of agreement), the more intense political disagreements of the Mutz
measure probably border on outright conflict, and are therefore less likely to occur. Additionally,
intense disagreement may inhibit learning, as people seek to avoid personal relationships that put
conflict front-and-center (e.g., Festinger 1957). Overall, then, we expect measures at different points
of this continuum to hold varied implications for the frequency of political disagreement, and for
behavioral outcomes.
We pursue this line of argument by looking at two measures that hold different spots within
our hypothetical discussion space: a partisanship difference measure and a general disagreement
8

measure. Our examination focuses on the extent to which these measures provide us with similar or
divergent pictures of how disagreement influences political behavior. Our goal is not to provide a
―right‖ or ―wrong‖ approach per se, as either measure could be meaningful in different research
contexts. Instead, we seek to demonstrate that the choice of how to define disagreement holds
important consequences for our understanding of the concept.
Disagreement and Causal Inference
Researchers looking at political disagreement have been explicitly interested in consequences
for political behavior. However, as membership in social networks (and in particular, disagreeable
networks) is not forced upon individuals, social relationships are partly the product of individual
choices. The implication of this is that any observed correlations between political behavior and
political discussion are analytically suspect. This is particularly true for cross-sectional data, where
temporal separation between ―cause‖ and ―effect‖ cannot be leveraged.
Klofstad (2007, 2011) elaborates on this analytic bias (see also Fowler et al. 2011), outlining
three identification problems in social network research. The first is the problem of selection bias,
where discussion and disagreement in networks is driven by individuals‘ political preferences and
behaviors (i.e., individuals who embed themselves in disagreeable networks could be systematically
different from those who surround themselves with agreeable discussants). The second is the
problem of reciprocal causation, where disagreement may affect political behavior, but feedback exists
from those behaviors back to disagreement. Last is spurious causation, where factors that lead to
political behaviors – e.g., partisan intensity and/or educational level – also lead to the structure of a
social network and certain levels of discussion.
Political scientists have adapted to these biases with a combination of experimental design
(Klofstad 2007; Nickerson 2008) and statistical techniques (Klofstad 2007, 2011). Here we employ
propensity score matching (see Ho et al. 2007 for a discussion), a statistical procedure used to
9

impose experimental control on observational data, to address several of these analytical hurdles
facing the literature. Below we discuss the data, measures, and this methodological tack in more
detail.
Data and Method
Our evidence comes from the January 2009 release of the 2008-2009 American National
Election Studies (ANES) Panel Survey (ANES 2009).5 This data set contains information collected
at six different points in time over the course of 2008: January, February, June, September, October,
and November. A nationally-representative sample of respondents was recruited to participate over
the telephone, and completed each questionnaire over the Internet. Individuals without Internet
access were supplied with a free web browsing device. Respondents received a $10 incentive for
each completed questionnaire (additional information on how this study was conducted is available
in DeBell et al. (2009)).
Independent Variables: Two Measures of Political Disagreement
In the September, 2008 questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify the members of
their political discussion network through a ―name generator‖ procedure (see Klofstad et al. 2009
for details on similar procedures; also see Knoke and Yang (2008) for more information on egocentric data structures). Specifically, respondents were first asked, ―During the last six months, did
you talk with anyone face-to-face, on the phone, by email, or in any other way about government or
elections, or did you not do this with anyone during the last six months?‖ Those responding in the
affirmative (N = 1225) were asked to name up to four individuals with whom they engaged in such
5

―Note that the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study is entirely separate from the 2008 ANES Time Series

study, which was conducted using the traditional ANES method of face-to-face interviews before
and after the 2008 election. Although there are a few questions common to both studies, the
samples and methods are different‖ (DeBell et al. 2009, p. 5).
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discussion. Respondents were then asked a series of follow-up questions about each named
discussant.
Consistent with our previous discussion of the concept, we operationalize exposure to
interpersonal political disagreement in two ways. One measure is based on the respondent‘s
perception of how much disagreement is occurring in his or her network (hereafter referred to as
―general disagreement‖). For each discussant, respondents were asked, ―In general, how different are
[DISCUSSANT NAME]‘s opinions about government and elections from your own views:
extremely different, very different, moderately different, slightly different, or not at all different?‖
We first summed the disagreement scales for each member of the discussion network (i.e., we
created a measure of the total amount of perceived disagreement in the network). The final general
disagreement scale was then created by dividing the sum of the disagreement scales by the number
of discussants mentioned by the respondent; this is done in order to make the scale comparable for
respondents with differently-sized networks. We use this measure to represent general political
disagreement, or disagreement that would be evident to all parties involved. As such, it would be
placed on the right side of the hypothetical discussion space presented in Figure 1.
Our second measure of disagreement is based on the respondent‘s report of the partisan
leanings of her discussants (hereafter referred to as ―partisan disagreement‖). This measure is based
on the standard ANES battery of questions producing a 7-point partisanship scale running from
―Strong Democrat‖ to ―Strong Republican.‖ To construct the partisanship-based disagreement scale
we subtracted the mean partisanship score of the discussion network (to calculate this we took the
sum of the identification scores for all discussants in a network, and divided by the number of
discussants mentioned by the respondent) from the respondent‘s own partisanship score. Again, the
mean of the network is used in order to make the scale comparable for respondents with differently
sized networks. This yields a measure where both larger positive and negative numbers indicate
11

greater levels of partisan disagreement between the respondent and his or her discussants. As such,
we use the absolute value of this measure as the final scale, where larger values indicate greater levels
of disagreement. We use this measure to represent what we call the partisan approach to political
disagreement, where people have different views but do not necessarily experience high degrees of
conflict; it would be placed on the left side of the hypothetical discussion space presented in Figure
1.
Dependent Variables: Political Preferences and Behaviors
In the following analyses, we examine the relationship between exposure to interpersonal
political disagreement and a number of different measures of political preferences and behavior.
Each dependent variable was gathered in waves of the panel survey subsequent to when the network
data were collected in September, 2008. This temporal separation between the independent and
dependent variables (with disagreement measured prior to the dependent variables) increases the
precision of our analysis.
Our first set of dependent variables captures the strength of respondents‘ political
preferences. One variable measures how certain respondents were about their 2008 presidential vote
choice in October of 2008. Respondents were first asked to predict their vote choice, after which
they were asked, ―How sure are you of that: extremely sure, very sure, moderately sure, slightly sure,
or not sure at all?‖ A second variable measures the strength of respondents‘ partisanship in
November of 2008; it is based on the standard ANES self-identification question that yields a 7point scale running from ―Strong Democrat‖ to ―Strong Republican.‖ Strength of partisanship is
operationalized by ―folding‖ the 7-point scale into a 4-point scale that runs from ―Independent‖ to
―Strong Partisan.‖ Finally, we also examine the relationship between disagreement and strength of
ideology, based on the standard ANES self-identification question that yields a 7-point scale running
from ―Very Liberal‖ to ―Very Conservative.‖ As with strength of partisanship, strength of ideology
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is operationalized by transforming the 7-point scale into a 4-point scale that runs from ―Moderate‖
to ―Strong Ideologue.‖
Our second set of dependent variables is concerned with how civically engaged respondents
were over the course of the 2008 election. One measure captures media use in October, 2008 by
summing the number of days per week that respondents used television, radio, the Internet or
newspapers for news consumption. A second measure gauges how interested respondents were in
politics during November, 2008 based on the question, ―How interested are you in information
about what‘s going on in government and politics: extremely interested, very interested, moderately
interested, slightly interested, or not interested at all?‖ We also examine two measures of political
efficacy in November of 2008. The first measures external efficacy based on the question, ―How
much do government officials care what people like you think: a great deal, a lot, a moderate
amount, a little, or not at all?‖ The second taps internal efficacy: ―How much can people like you
affect what the government does: a great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or not at all?‖
Finally, we also examine two measures of political engagement and participation. The first
gauges how frequently, overall, respondents engaged in political discussion in November, 2008,
based on the question, ―During a typical week, how many days do you talk about politics with family
or friends?‖ It is important to note that unlike the more detailed, ego-centric discussion network
questions administered in September, 2008, this variable is a much simpler indicator of how actively
respondents were engaged in political dialogue (it is also important to note that the ego-centric
network questions did not measure the frequency of political discussion between the respondent and
her named discussants). Last but not least, we look at voter turnout in the 2008 election, as selfreported in the November, 2008 wave of the panel.
Method: Data Preprocessing
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In order to strengthen our inferences, we address the various analytical biases discussed
earlier by preprocessing the ANES data with a ―matching‖ procedure (e.g., Dunning, 2008; Ho,
King and Stuart, 2007a; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007b). Under this procedure the effect of being
exposed to political disagreement is more accurately measured by comparing the attitudes and
behaviors of survey respondents who are similar to one another, save the fact that one was exposed
to interpersonal disagreement and the other was not; in other words, the idea is that the researcher
imposes some degree of ―experimental‖ control on what is observational data. By comparing the
attitudes and behaviors of similar individuals who were and were not exposed to disagreement, we
can be more confident that any observed difference in attitudes and behaviors between them is
unrelated to the factors that the respondents were matched on, and as such, is a consequence of
being exposed to disagreement instead of some confounding factor.6 More details on how this
procedure was conducted are included in the appendix.

6

Matching is less precise than a controlled experiment because the procedure does not account for

unobserved differences between individuals who were and were not exposed to disagreement (e.g.,
Arceneaux et al. 2006; Sekhon 2009). However, an extensive set of pre-treatment covariates were
used in the matching procedure (see Tables 1 and 2), increasing the likelihood that any meaningful
covariates of political disagreement are accounted for in the analysis. Moreover, unobserved
differences between individuals who were and were not exposed to political disagreement are likely
to correlate with observed differences, and as such are accounted for by proxy in the matching
procedure (Stuart and Green 2008). As such, given that a true experiment is an extremely difficult (if
not impossible) research design to execute for this research question, matching (in concert with
panel data) is arguably a next best alternative.
14

Results7
Who Is Exposed to Disagreement?
Before examining the effect that different conceptualizations and measures of disagreement
have on political preferences and behaviors, to motivate the matching procedure and gain some
purchase on the social processes affecting respondents, we first examine what types of individuals
are exposed to disagreeable dialogue. Tables 1 and 2 present variables that correlate with exposure to
disagreement in political discussion networks; again, these variables were collected in waves of the
ANES Panel Study that occurred before the network battery was administered (i.e., ―pre-treatment‖).
Disagreement is dichotomized at the mean for each of the distinct disagreement scores, where above
the mean indicates a disagreeable network (the treatment), and below the mean indicates an
agreeable network (the control).
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1 displays the various covariates of general disagreement in one‘s political discussion
network. Specifically, the percentages demonstrate that for this measure, women are less likely to be
embedded in disagreeable networks than men. Individuals in general-disagreeable networks are also
less partisan/ideological, and have weaker attitudes about the Republicans and Democrats.
However, while their weaker preferences might signal political disengagement, individuals in these
types of networks consume more news media, are more knowledgeable about politics, are more
likely to have donated money to a political or social organization, are more likely to have attended a
meeting about political or social matters, and are more likely to have recruited someone else to
attend such a meeting. As such, the data suggest that individuals in disagreeable networks,

7

All results exclude individuals who did not report having any political discussants (N = 312, or

20% of the 1567 cases in the data set).
15

conceptualized in terms of general disagreement, are more politically engaged, but more agnostic
about their political leanings when compared to individuals in agreeable networks.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 examines the correlates of exposure to our second measure, partisan disagreement. In
contrast to Table 1, these data show that individuals embedded in networks marked by this type of
disagreement have stronger political preferences than individuals in agreeable networks. As in Table 1,
however, these data also indicate that individuals in partisan-disagreeable networks are more likely to
have engaged in civic activities.
The results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that individuals who are exposed to disagreement,
regardless of type, tend to be more civically engaged and active compared to individuals in more
agreeable networks. However, the data also suggest that general disagreement and partisan
disagreement are capturing different forms of disagreement, experienced by different types of
people. In short then, the results indicate that individuals who perceive general disagreement have
weaker political preferences, while individuals who experience disagreement measured by a lack of
shared partisan preferences have stronger political preferences. The differences between these two
measures of disagreement are reinforced by the fact that the two measures are negatively correlated
(r = -.09, p <.01 across the full scales; r = -.014, p<.61 for the dichotomized treatments), and that
the average level of general disagreement (mean=.50) is significantly greater than that of partisan
disagreement (mean=.41) (t=4.55, p<.01). Overall, the two conceptualizations of disagreement
appear to be rooted in at least somewhat divergent sources/social processes.
The Relationship between Disagreement and Political Preferences and Behavior
The remaining tables present multivariate analyses of the relationship between exposure to
the two conceptualizations of interpersonal political disagreement, and various measures of political
preferences and behavior. To address the analytical biases described previously, each of these
16

analyses incorporates the matching data preprocessing procedure. The precision of the analysis is
also increased by the inclusion of a number of control variables that are known to be correlated with
political preferences and behavior: demographic characteristics, strength of political preferences,
past patterns of political behavior, and civic engagement. Each of these variables was measured
months before respondents reported whether they were or were not exposed to disagreement,
allowing us to assess the effect of exposure to political disagreement while controlling for ―who the
respondent was‖ at the ―pre-treatment‖ stage.
Strength of Political Preferences
In Table 3 we begin our analysis by estimating the relationship between exposure to
disagreement and strength of political preferences. For purposes of comparison, for each
dependent variable results are presented side-by-side for general disagreement and partisan
disagreement.8 The data in the first two columns show a negative relationship between exposure to
disagreement and being certain about one‘s impending vote choice for president, regardless of which
measure is employed. Substantively, for example, individuals who perceived general disagreement in
their social network are estimated to be thirteen percentage points less likely to be ―extremely‖
certain about their vote choice (a decrease from 72% among those who did not perceive general
disagreement, to 59% among those who did so).9 Partisan disagreement is estimated to have
8

In this effort we focus on the main ―treatment‖ effects for the different measures of disagreement.

We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the possibility of modifiers on the treatments
(i.e., interactive effects with the measures of disagreement), and plan to explore this further in
subsequent work.
9

Substantive interpretations of coefficients are estimated holding all other factors in the model at

their means. These estimates were derived using the ―setx‖ and ―sim‖ procedures in the ―Zelig‖
package for R (Imai et al. 2007a and b).
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decreased the likelihood of a respondent being ―extremely‖ certain about her vote choice by a more
modest five percentage points (a decrease from 68% among those not in disagreeable partisan
networks, to 63% among those in disagreeable partisan networks).
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The next four columns in Table 3 display the relationship between disagreement and
strength of partisan and ideological preferences, respectively. The data show that while we cannot
detect a systematic relationship between exposure to partisan disagreement and strength of political
preferences, we find a significant negative relationship for general disagreement.10 Substantively,
individuals who perceive general disagreement in their social network are estimated to be twelve
percentage points less likely to be ―strong‖ partisans (a decrease from 50% among those who did
not perceive disagreement, to 38% among those who did perceive disagreement); they are estimated
to be four percentage points less likely to be ―strong‖ ideologues (a decrease from 20% among those
who did not perceive general disagreement, to 16% among those who did perceive such
disagreement).
The difference between the two disagreement measures is important. Across all three
dependent variables, we see that social interactions that are significant enough to register as general
disagreements have important consequences for the strength of preferences held by individuals.
Partisan disagreement, which we have theorized as the milder form of disagreement (wherein we
believe that learning occurs, but that disagreement is less likely to be marked by conflict) has either
non-existent or less-pronounced consequences for vote certainty and preferences. When we
10

Substituting measures of partisan and ideological strength collected in October, 2008 (instead of

November 2008) produces comparable results, with the exception of the relationship between
general disagreement and ideological strength; the coefficient is negative, but not statistically
significant at conventional levels (b = -.14, s.e. = .08; p = .11).
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remember that these results give us at least some leverage on who respondents were prior to the
―treatment,‖ given the panel nature of the data, the implication is significant: stronger, more
conflictual interactions can lead people away from rock-solid political views. Simply interacting with
people who do not share your partisan preferences may not weaken preferences or devotion to
them, even if (as we assume) they do create opportunities for political learning.
Civic Engagement
Table 4 presents the estimated relationship between the two disagreement measures and
various measures of civic engagement. The first two columns of the table show that while we are
unable to detect a relationship between general disagreement and news media usage, individuals in
partisan-disagreeable networks consumed less news media on the eve of the 2008 election.
Substantively, this relationship between exposure to partisan disagreement and media use is actually
rather modest – individuals embedded in such social networks only consumed six percent less media
content (the equivalent of about a one-point decline on the 28-point consumption scale).
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The next two columns of Table 4 show a negative relationship between general disagreement and
interest in politics; we do not detect such a relationship with partisan disagreement.11 Substantively,
however, the effect of general disagreement on political interest is rather meager. For example,
individuals who perceived general disagreement in their social network are estimated to be only two
percentage points less likely to be ―extremely‖ or ―very‖ interested in politics (a decrease from 76%
among those who did not experience general disagreement, to 74% among those who did).12 We

11

The October, 2008 measure of political interest produces comparable results.

12

If we substitute the October measure of political interest for the November, 2008 measure, the

result is statistically insignificant (b = .12, s.e. = .08; p = .13).
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also note that in results not presented here, neither measure of disagreement is related to external or
internal political efficacy.
Overall Level of Political Discussion and Voter Turnout
Finally, we examine the effect that political disagreement has on the rate of overall political
discussion and voter turnout. The first two columns demonstrate that general disagreement predicts
less frequent instances of overall political discussion; we do not detect a systematic relationship with
partisan disagreement.13 Substantively, the relationship between general disagreement and political
discussion is quite small; individuals who perceived general disagreement in their social network
were only five percent less talkative about politics with their friends and family (a decrease from 3.8
days per week among those who did not perceive general disagreement, to 3.6 days per week among
those who did perceive disagreement). Importantly, in the last two columns of Table 5 we do not
detect any relationship between either approach to interpersonal political disagreement and turnout
in the 2008 election – a result that speaks to the democratic dilemma highlighted by Mutz (2002;
2006).
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Discussion and Conclusion
Over the past decade, scholars have produced a considerable amount of work on the
empirical consequences of political disagreement; this includes examinations of both political
preferences and behaviors. Upon closer inspection, we see that this literature has a rather shaky
foundation; there are legitimate differences of opinion—sometimes explicit, often implicit—about
what disagreement is and about how to best measure it. There are, in short, serious disagreements
about disagreement.
13

The October, 2008 measure of overall political discussion produces comparable results for general

disagreement, but not for partisan disagreement (b = -.07, s.e. = .03; p = .03).
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In this paper, we take a step back to highlight two analytical biases regarding disagreement.
Having re-conceptualized the range and theoretical premises of existing measures (see Figure 1), we
examine two measures of disagreement that reflect different points within the possible conceptual
space, and provide robust inferences with contemporary, nationally-representative panel survey data.
Our initial analysis demonstrates that the choice of measures matters: while the more civically
engaged among us are more likely to experience both types of political disagreement, those
individuals who are exposed to general political disagreement tend to have weaker political
preferences, while those who experience partisanship-based interpersonal political disagreement tend
to have stronger political preferences. And, in pointing out these differences, we find that networks
with disagreement salient enough to register as ―general disagreement‖ seem to cut at the
foundations of many important behaviors. Conversely, disagreement based on the absence of
agreement (i.e., partisan disagreement) rather than the overt presence of conflict has no such
impacts, despite the fact that other research demonstrates it to be an important covariate for a wide
array of behaviors (e.g., Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).
Table 6 summarizes the distinct effects that these conceptualizations of disagreement have
across the 9 political outcomes considered in the paper. Having pre-processed our data to account
for a host of confounding factors – and using identical specifications for each set of models – we
find that estimates of the relationship between the two measures of disagreement and various
behavioral outcomes do not match on direction 1/3 of the time; they do not match in terms of their
statistical significance/insignificance over ½ of the time. Moreover, even when the two measures
do match in terms of directionality and statistical significance, they do not match in terms of the size
of their effects. For example, we find that general disagreement has a much larger effect when it
comes to decreasing vote certainty relative to partisanship-based disagreement.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
21

One finding alluded to previously that is particularly noteworthy in-light of the recent debate
over disagreement is the relationship between exposure to disagreement and voter turnout. While
Mutz (2002; 2006) argues that disagreement leads to decreased participation (through mechanisms of
ambivalence and social accountability), we find no evidence of such a relationship after accounting
for the factors that potentially select people into certain types of micro-social environments.
Moreover, not only are the estimates non-significant across both measures of disagreement, but we
find that general disagreement predicts casting a vote (positive coefficient), while partisanship based
disagreement predicts the opposite (negative coefficient).
Taken together, our results reaffirm the growing body of work suggesting that networks do
produce real political effects, independent of other factors. At the same time, however, they remind
us of a fundamental lesson that has largely escaped the study of political networks in the mass
public: how we conceive of and measure political phenomena matters. Different types of
disagreement not only reflect different social processes (Tables 1 and 2), but appear to have different
effects when it comes to individuals‘ political preferences, their patterns of political engagement, and
their likelihoods of political participation. Disagreement does not have simple, easily characterized
effects, and therefore may not be a double-edged sword for democratic practice. In turn, this
suggests that our focus should not be on keeping the good parts of disagreement (i.e., those that
produce tolerance) while changing or ameliorating the bad (i.e., those that suppress participation).
Rather, we should modify the often-asked question of who experiences disagreement, to consider
who experiences what kinds of disagreement.
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Appendix
For this analysis, a ―full matching‖ procedure was used (Gu and Rosenbaum, 1993; Hansen
2004; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007a; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007b; Rosenbaum, 1991; Stuart and Green
2008). The procedure was conducted using the ―MatchIt‖ package for R (Ho, Imai, King and Stuart,
2007a; Ho, Imai, King and Stuart, 2007b), which makes use of the ―optmatch‖ package (Hansen,
2004). The ANES Panel Survey data set is tailor-made for matching because subjects were surveyed
about various attitudes and behaviors in waves of the panel (January, February, and June, 2008) that
occurred before they were asked about their political discussion network (September, 2008). Each of
the pre-treatment variables that correlated with a given measure of exposure to disagreement (see
Tables 1 and 2) were included in the matching procedure.
The full matching procedure involved three steps. First, study subjects were classified as
either having been ―treated‖ or ―untreated‖ with disagreement. Respondents who were exposed to
an above-average amount of disagreement were classified as having been treated, while those who
were exposed to a below-average amount of disagreement were classified as untreated/controls.14
Second, the variables included in the matching procedure were used to estimate a score of one‘s
propensity to be exposed to disagreement (Hansen, 2004; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007a; Ho, King and
Stuart, 2007b). Third, at least one untreated subject was matched to at least one treated subject based
on how close the propensity scores were between treated and untreated subjects (i.e., a process of
creating ―subclasses,‖ where more than one treated subject could be matched to an untreated
subject, and vice-versa). Each untreated subject was only matched to one treated subject, and viceversa (i.e., matching without replacement). Also, after a subject was initially matched he or she could
14

For the average level of general disagreement, this resulted in the classification of 633 treated

subjects, and 622 untreated subjects. For partisan disagreement, this resulted in the classification of
517 treated subjects, and 738 untreated subjects.
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have been moved and matched to a different subject before the procedure concluded in order to
improve the overall similarity between the treated and untreated subjects in the data set (i.e., the
process is ―optimal‖ not ―greedy‖). This process was conducted separately for each of the
disagreement treatments (i.e., both general and partisan).
The results of the matching procedure were incorporated into the analysis by weighting the
regression models – models on general disagreement used the weights from the matching procedure
for the general disagreement ―treatment,‖ and models on partisan disagreement used the weights
derived from the matching procedure for the partisan ―treatment.‖ All treated subjects were given a
weight of 1. Untreated subjects were assigned a weight equal to the number of treated subjects in the
subclass that they were assigned to, divided by the number of untreated subjects in the subclass that
they were assigned to. For example, an untreated subject who was assigned to a subclass with 10
treated subjects and 1 untreated subject was assigned a weight of 10, while an untreated subject who
was assigned to a subclass with 1 treated subject and 10 untreated subject was assigned a weight of
.10. Consequently, an untreated subject who is similar to many treated subjects is given more weight
in the analysis than an untreated subject who was similar to only a few treated subjects. Otherwise
stated, applying this weight causes the regression models to pay more attention to untreated subjects
who are similar to treated subjects, and less attention to untreated subjects who are dissimilar to
treated subjects – this makes the analysis a better comparison between the treated and untreated
subjects than if the data were not weighted.
[TABLE A.1 ABOUT HERE]
The results presented in Table A.1 illustrate how the matching procedure increased the
similarity, or ―balance‖ (Ho et al. 2007a and 2007b), between subjects who did and did not engage in
the types of disagreement. The first row in the table shows the overall improvement in similarity
between treated and untreated subjects, as measured by the subject‘s estimated propensity to be
24

exposed to disagreement (i.e., the propensity score created by the matching procedure). Overall, the
similarity in the propensity to be exposed to disagreement between the ―treated‖ and ―untreated‖
increased by around 100 percent as a result of the matching procedure. The remaining rows of the
table show the summary statistics from ―QQ plots.‖ QQ plots are two-dimensional graphs which
plot the empirical distribution of a variable among treated subjects on one axis against the empirical
distribution of that same variable among untreated subjects on the other axis. The closer this plotted
line is to the 45-dergee line on the graph, the closer treated and untreated subjects are to being
perfectly balanced on that variable. The results in Table A.1 show that the median, mean and
maximum distance of the propensity score QQ plot from the 45-degree line were all greatly
improved due to the matching procedure.
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Figure 1. A Hypothetical Discussion Space Representing Approaches to the Measurement
and Conceptualization of Political Disagreement

Agreement

Disagreement

e.g., Huckfeldt et al. (2004)

e.g., Mutz (2006)

(Partisan Disagreement)

(General Disagreement)

-Minimally divergent preferences
-Minimal recognition of differences

-Strongly divergent preferences
-Clear recognition of differences
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Table 1: Who is Exposed To Disagreement? (General Disagreement)
Type of Network
(09/2008)
Agreeable
Disagreeable
Gender (Female)

59.9%

52.4%

Strength of Partisanship (01/2008)

3.1

2.9

Strength of Ideology (01/2008)

2.7

2.6

2.7

2.4

2.6

2.3

Media Use (01/2008)

15.1

15.8

Political Knowledge (02/2008)

4.0

4.3

62%

68%

54%

61%

29%

34%

Strength of Likes/Dislikes About Democrats
(01/2008)
Strength of Likes/Dislikes About Republicans
(01/2008)

Has Ever Given Money to Organization
Concerned with Political or Social Issue (06/2008)
Has Ever Attended a Meeting About
Political/Social Concerns (06/2008)
Has Ever Invited Someone to a Meeting About
Political/Social Concerns (06/2008)

Difference
-7.5%
(t = 2.66, p < .01)
-.2
(t = 5.31, p < .01)
-.1
(t = 2.02, p = .05)
-.3
(t = 4.15, p = > .01)
-.3
(t = 4.72, p = > .01)
+.7
(t = -2.01, p = .05)
+.3
(t = -3.28, p < .01)
+6%
(t = -2.72, p = .08)
+7%
(t = -2.72, p = .01)
+5%
(t = -2.00, p = .08)

Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study
Note: The disagreement measure is a dichotomy, whereby agreeable networks are those with below
average levels of political disagreement, and disagreeable networks are those with above average levels of
disagreement (see the discussion of the matching procedure in the Appendix).
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Table 2: Who is Exposed To Disagreement? (Partisan Disagreement)
Type of Network (09/08)
Agreeable Disagreeable
Strength of Partisanship (01/08)

2.7

3.4

Strength of Ideology (01/08)

2.6

2.8

2.4

2.7

2.3

2.6

28%

33%

32%

37%

Strength of Likes/Dislikes About
Democrats (01/08)
Strength of Likes/Dislikes About
Republicans (01/08)
Ever Joined a Protest, Rally,
Demonstration (06/08)
Has Ever Distributed Political
Information or Advertisements (06/08)

Difference
+.7
(t = -12.82, p < .01)
+.2
(t = -3.80, p < .01)
+.3
(t = -5.25, p = > .01)
+.3
(t = -3.88, p = > .01)
+5%
(t = -1.82, p = .08)
+5%
(t = -1.71, p = .09)

Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study
Note: The disagreement measure is a dichotomy, whereby agreeable networks are those with
below average levels of political disagreement, and disagreeable networks are those with above
average levels of disagreement (see the discussion of the matching procedure in the Appendix).
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Table 3: The Effect of Disagreement on Strength of Political Preferences
Vote Certainty
Strength of Party ID
(10/08)
(11/08)

Strength of Ideology
(11/08)

General
Disagreement

Partisan
Disagreement

General
Disagreement

Partisan
Disagreement

General
Disagreement

Partisan
Disagreement

-.32** (.12)

-.16* (.09)

-.21*** (.07)

.02 (.08)

-.20** (.08)

-.06 (.11)

.02 (.10)

.13 (.08)

.17** (.08)

-.001 (.07)

-.10 (.10)

-.003 (.01)

-.004 (.003)

-.006 (.003)

-.003 (.004)

.11 (.14)
.02 (05)
-.003 (.01)

.11 (.10)
> -.001
(.003)
-.03 (.15)
.04 (.06)
-.006 (.01)

.08 (.14)
-.04 (.05)
-.01 (.01)

.05 (.15)
-.04 (.05)
-.003 (.01)

-.19 (.13)
-.03 (.04)
.008 (.01)

-.19 (.17)
-.03 (.04)
.02 (.01)

.21*** (.05)

.34*** (.05)

.87*** (.05)

.86*** (.07)

.23*** (.05)

.26*** (.06)

.20*** (.04)

.21*** (.05)

.22*** (.05)

.21*** (.05)

.64*** (.04)

.63*** (.06)

-.01 (.02)

-.005 (.02)

-.01 (.02)

-.005 (.02)

.03 (.02)

.02 (.02)

-.06*** (.02)

-.09*** (.02)

-.04 (.03)

-.04 (.02)

.05* (.02)

.04* (.02)

-.23 (.19)

-.15 (.14)

.31 (.18)

.46** (.18)

.22 (.17)

.15 (.16)

.18*** (.05)

.20*** (.04)

.09* (.05)

.12* (.06)

.12*** (.04)

.10* (.05)

.06* (.04)

.03 (.03)

-.03 (.04)

-.07 (.04)

.08* (.04)

.03 (.05)

2644

2366

2473

2115

2773

2763

1225
1225
1225
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses)
Model Type: Ordered Probit (Imai et al. 2007c)
Note: Estimated cut points are not presented.
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study

1225

1225

1225

Exposed to
Disagreement
(09/08)
Demographics
Gender (Female)
Age
Race (Non-White)
Education
Income
Strength of
Preferences (01/08)
Strength of
Partisanship
Strength of Ideology
Direction of
Preferences (01/08)
Partisanship
(DemocratRepublican)
Ideology (LiberalConservative)
Past Patterns of
Political Behavior
Voted in 2004
Civic Engagement
Political Interest
(01/08)
Political Knowledge
(02/08)
Akaike’s
Information
Criterion (AIC)
N

.003 (.003)
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Table 4: The Effect of Disagreement on Civic Engagement
Media Use (10/08)a
Exposed to Disagreement
(09/08)
Demographics
Gender (Female)
Age
Race (Non-White)
Education
Income
Strength of Preferences (01/08)
Strength of Partisanship
Strength of Ideology
Direction of Preferences (01/08)
Partisanship (Democrat-Republican)
Ideology (Liberal-Conservative)
Past Patterns of Pol. Behavior
Voted in 2004
Civic Engagement
Political Interest (01/08)
Political Knowledge (02/08)
Intercept
Adjusted R2
Akaike’s Information Criterion
N

Political Interest (11/08)b

General
Disagreement

Partisan
Disagreement

General
Disagreement

Partisan
Disagreement

-.33 (.42)

-.90** (.36)

-.12* (.07)

-.14 (.10)

-.48 (.39)
.08*** (.02)
.08 (.49)
-.05 (.27)
.18*** (.05)

-.65 (.47)
.08*** (.01)
.34 (.49)
-.14 (.19)
.16*** (.05)

.08 (.10)
.01* (.003)
.28** (.13)
.02 (.07)
.01 (.01)

.13 (.10)
.01* (.003)
.10 (.10)
.02 (.05)
.01 (.01)

.22 (.20)
-.11 (.21)

.30 (.28)
-.21 (.26)

.08 (.05)
.11*** (.04)

.13*** (.05)
.10* (.06)

-.07 (.10)
-.06 (.13)

-.11 (.07)
-.14 (.10)

-.03 (.02)
-.05* (.02)

-.01 (.02)
-.05** (.02)

1.24 (.88)

1.29 (.84)

.44** (.17)

.31 (.24)

1.45*** (.22)
.58*** (.14)
.47 (1.63)

1.42*** (.24)
.64*** (.19)
1.63 (1.53)

.73*** (.05)
.03 (.03)
---

.76*** (.07)
.02 (.05)
---

.21
--1225

.22
--1225

--2730
1225

--2657
1225

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses)
Model Type: aOrdinary Least Squares (Imai et al. 2007d); bOrdered Probit (Imai et al. 2007c); cPoisson (Imai et al.
2007e)
Note: Estimated cut points are not presented.
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study
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Table 5: The Effect of Disagreement on Political Discussion and Voter Turnout
Political Discussion
2008
(11/2008)a
Voter Turnoutb
Exposed to Disagreement
(09/2008)
Demographics
Gender (Female)
Age
Race (Non-White)
Education
Income
Strength of Preferences
(01/2008)
Strength of Partisanship
Strength of Ideology
Direction of Preferences
(01/2008)
Partisanship (DemocratRepublican)
Ideology (Liberal-Conservative)
Past Patterns of Political
Behavior
Voted in 2004
Civic Engagement
Political Interest (01/2008)
Political Knowledge (02/2008)
Intercept

General
Disagreement

Partisan
Disagreement

General
Disagreement

Partisan
Disagreement

-.06*(.03)

-.02 (.04)

.32 (.27)

-.32 (.24)

.06 (.04)
> .001
(.001)
-.01 (.06)
.003 (.02)
.02*** (.004)

.07** (.03)

.38 (.26)

.45 (.33)

> .001 (.001)

.02 (.01)

.02* (.01)

-.03 (.09)
.03 (.02)
.01** (.01)

-.02 (.30)
.22 (.16)
.02 (.04)

-.14 (.41)
.23* (.13)
.04 (.04)

.02 (.02)
.02 (.02)

.07*** (.02)
.02 (.02)

.06 (.15)
.22 (.17)

.07 (.14)
.20 (.16)

-.01* (.007)

-.01** (.01)

-.09 (.06)

-.08 (.06)

-.01 (.01)

-.01 (.01)

-.05 (.08)

-.03 (.08)

.12 (.08)

.11 (.09)

2.11*** (.51)

1.79*** (.51)

.25*** (.02)
.03*** (.01)
-.16 (.14)

.24*** (.04)
.03 (.03)
-.34** (.14)

.21 (.14)
.14* (.08)
-3.21*** (.90)

.30** (.13)
-.02 (.10)
-2.82*** (.88)

Akaike’s Information
5158
5157
639
Criterion (AIC)
N
1225
1225
1225
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses)
Model Type: aPoisson (Imai et al. 2007e); bLogistic (Imai et al. 2007f)
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study

596
1225
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Table 6: Summary of Findings by Types of Political
Outcomes
Treatment
Outcome
General
Partisan
Disagreement
Disagreement
Strength of Political Preferences
Vote Certainty
Negative*
Negative*
Strength of Party
Negative*
Positive
Identification
Strength of Ideology
Negative*
Negative
Civic Engagement
Media Use
Negative
Negative*
Political Interest
Negative*
Negative
External Efficacy
Negative
Negative
Internal Efficacy
Positive
Negative
Other Participatory Activities
Political Discussion
Negative*
Negative
2008 Turnout
Positive
Negative
Source: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study
Note: *=statistically significant finding
All results come from models estimated on matched data.
Please see the appendix for details.
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Table A.1: Improvement in Balance Between Treated
and Untreated Cases
Average General
Partisan
Disagreement
Disagreement
Overall
99.6%
100.0%
QQ Plot Summary Statistics
Median

95.3%

96.7%

Mean

93.3%

95.5%

Max
85.3%
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study

91.7%
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